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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.'
(decided May 12, 2009)
Petitioners, a group of Brooklyn residents and business own-
ers, brought suit to prevent the condemnation of their homes and
businesses in conjunction with the Atlantic Yards Redevelopment
Project.2 Claiming that the condemnation violated the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
Petitioners originally filed suit in federal district court. 4 After unsuc-
cessfully seeking relief in federal court, Petitioners commenced a
state court proceeding under New York Eminent Domain Procedure
Law ("EDPL") section 207." Petitioners argued that the Public Use
Clause of the New York Constitution 6 requires a more restrictive
standard for the taking of private property than that required by the
United States Constitution, and that this higher standard had not been
met in the present case.7 The appellate division rejected Petitioners'
claim that the Public Use Clause must be read in a literal fashion so
that private property may be taken only when it is held open for use
by the general public.8 Instead, the appellate division held that the
condemnation did not violate the New York Constitution because the
public benefits anticipated by the completion of the Atlantic Yards
Project are not incidental to the benefit that the project's private de-
l (Goldstein 1), 879 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009), affd, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y.
2009).
2 Id. at 526.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
4 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
5 Id.
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7, states in pertinent part: "Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation."
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veloper will receive.9
On December 11, 2003, the Forest City Ratner Companies
("Forest City") announced their plan to redevelop twenty-two acres
of land located south of Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn.' 0 Forest City
then entered into a partnership with New York State Urban Devel-
opment Corporation d/b/a Empire State Development Corporation
("ESDC")." ESDC is a New York State corporation that has been
granted the power to obtain property through eminent domain as part
of its involvement in "public and private improvement programs to
reinvigorate blighted and economically distressed areas."' 2 Forest
City and ESDC entered into two Memoranda of Understanding on
February 18, 2005 in support of their joint effort to bring the Atlantic
Yards Project to fruition. 13
The most notable aspect of the project is the proposed con-
struction of an arena that would be used as the home for the New Jer-
sey Nets, a professional basketball team owned by Bruce Ratner.14 hn
addition to owning the New Jersey Nets, Ratner also serves as the
principal for Forest City.'5 The Atlantic Yards Project also includes
the creation of a new subway connection to facilitate transportation to
the new arena and the construction of sixteen buildings that will pro-
vide office space, retail space and between 5,000 and 6,000 residen-
tial units, with approximately one-third of the units catering to low-
and middle-income families. 16
Before ESDC began the development of the Atlantic Yards
Project, it commissioned a blight study of the project site that was
completed in July 2006.17 Based on the results of the study, the
ESDC concluded that "the project site was a substandard or unsanita-
ry area which tended to impair or arrest the sound growth and devel-
opment of the municipality in which it is situated, and that the project
consisted of a plan for the rehabilitation of the area." 8 This finding,
9 Id.
10 Id. at 527.
" Id.





17 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S2d at 527.
18 Id. at 528.
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made in accordance with EDPL section 204, led to the ESDC's de-
termination that it should use its power to acquire property through
eminent domain in order to go forward with the Atlantic Yards
Project. 9
In response, Petitioners filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York claiming that the con-
demnation violated the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 20 The Petitioners' main contention
was that the public uses set forth by the ESDC were merely pretexts
for a private taking since Bruce Ratner would substantially benefit
from the completion of the project. 2 1 The United States District
Court dismissed the claims, finding that the facts alleged in the com-
plaint were insufficient to show that the public purposes of the
project were simply pretexts for the benefit Forest City would receive
from the project. 22 Following this dismissal, Petitioners appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 3 Al-
though sympathetic to the Petitioners' plight, the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's dismissal and concluded that the Petitioners
failed to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment.24
After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
Petitioners commenced a proceeding under the EDPL in state court
alleging that the condemnation violated the Public Use Clause of the
New York Constitution. 25 The Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment was thus faced with two arguments to support Petitioners' con-
tention that a violation of the Public Use Clause had occurred. 26 Peti-
tioners' first theory was that the Public Use Clause must be read
narrowly so that the State would only be allowed to use its power to
take private property for public use "where the condemned property
is to be held open for use by all members of the public."27 Second,
19 Id.
2o Id.; see Goldstein v. Pataki (Goldstein 11), 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
21 Goldstein 1, 879 N.Y.S2d at 528; see Goldstein II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 287-88.
22 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (citing Goldstein II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 291).
23 Id. (citing Goldstein v. Pataki (Goldstein 111), 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008)).
24 Id. (citing Goldstein III, 516 F.3d at 64-65) ("While we can well understand why the
affected property owners would take this opportunity to air their complaints, such matters of
policy are the province of the elected branches, not this Court.").
2S id
26 Id. at 531.
27 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
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Petitioners argued that even if the Public Use Clause is read broadly,
the condemnation is still unconstitutional because their properties are
not blighted, and it is speculative whether the public will benefit from
the project. 28
With respect to their first argument, Petitioners contended that
a narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause should be followed
since this conforms to the intent of the framers of the New York Con-
stitution and the early case law interpreting this clause. 29 The broader
view of the Public Use Clause, which permits the taking of private
property for the purpose of economic development, is a relatively
new view in New York and based on federal law precedent, accord-
ing to Petitioners. 30 The appellate division disagreed with Petitioners,
citing New York case law which showed that New York had dis-
carded the literal interpretation of public use long before the Supreme
Court decided Kelo v. City ofNew London in 2005.31
The Appellate Division, Second Department went on to state
that Petitioners' interpretation of the New York Constitution is com-
pletely contradictory to EDPL section 207, which is the authority that
gave ESDC the power to condemn the property in the first place.3 2
Instead, the court noted that the more expansive view of public use
was codified in 1977 when the New York State Legislature enacted
the EDPL to unify the necessary procedures for eminent domain.
After rejecting Petitioners' first argument, the appellate divi-
sion then addressed their second theory, which was that even if the
court adopted a broader interpretation of "public use" the condemna-
tion was still unconstitutional.34 The appellate division disagreed
with this contention, stating that although Petitioners' property may
not be blighted, fifty-one out of seventy-three of the parcels that
make up the project site show signs of blighted conditions, including
vacant lots and above average crime rates.35 The court held that the
28 Id. at 533.
29 Id. at 531-32.
30 Id. at 532 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,480 (2005)).
31 Id. at 533 (explaining that the Court of Appeals of New York abandoned its narrow
view of public use in New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, I N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936)).




s Id. at 534.
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blight study provided a proper basis for deeming the land substan-
dard.36 This finding was important, as New York has long held that
where "land is found to be substandard, its taking for urban renewal
is for a public purpose." 37 The appellate division further held that Pe-
titioners' argument that the public may not benefit from the project
does not preclude it from being classified as a "public purpose" since
the argument was speculative in nature.38
Finally, Petitioners asserted that even if the condemnation
serves a public use, there was still a violation of the New York Con-
stitution since the public benefit was a mere pretext for conferring a
private benefit on Forest City and its principal, Bruce Ratner. 39 The
court rejected this argument and concluded that so long as the public
would benefit from the proposed project, the fact that private entities
may also benefit is irrelevant for eminent domain purposes. 40 Thus,
the appellate division held that the proposed taking did not violate the
New York State Constitution.4 1
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution places two conditions on the taking of private
property through eminent domain: "[T]he taking must be for a 'public
use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner." 42 The pub-
lic use element has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 3 The scope of this requirement, which was at issue in
Goldstein, has been defined by three Supreme Court cases. 4 4 In Ber-
man v. Parker, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, under which
the appellant's property had been condemned.4 5 The statute allowed
District of Columbia Land Agency to use whatever means necessary
to protect the public from conditions that were considered "injurious
36 Id. (citing Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Co., 494 N.E.2d 429, 441 (N.Y.
1986); Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 334 (N.Y. 1975)).
37 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 534 (quoting Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 331).
38 Id. at 535.
39 id.
40 Id. (citing Murray v. LaGuardia, 52 N.E.2d 884, 888 (N.Y. 1943)).
41 Id. at 536.
42 Goldstein II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538
U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)).
43 id.
4 See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
45 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
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to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare." 46
Appellants, who owned a department store on land designated
as blighted, brought suit claiming that they owned commercial prop-
erty, not "slum housing," and that the land was going to be re-
developed for private rather than public use.47 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, concluding that a Fifth Amendment violation
had not occurred and that Appellants' rights would be satisfied once
they had received just compensation for the land. 4 8 The Court ex-
plained that the responsibility of determining what the public interest
is belongs to Congress and not the judiciary.49 Thus, the judiciary
gives the legislature a great deal of deference in deciding whether the
power of eminent domain was exercised for a public purpose.so
Furthermore, since the concept of public welfare covers a
wide range of values, the legislature is well within its right to deter-
mine that an area should be both clean and beautiful.5 Consequently,
the Court held that regardless of whether they agreed with Congress's
specific determinations, the property was being taken for a public
purpose under the Fifth Amendment.52 Once it is determined that the
land was taken for a public purpose, Congress has the sole discretion
to decide the amount of land necessary for a particular project.53
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether the Public Use Clause of the
Fifth Amendment prevented the State of Hawaii from taking real
property from lessors and transferring it to lessees provided the State
justly compensated the lessors54 The Hawaii Legislature discovered
in the mid-1960s that while the State and Federal Governments
owned approximately forty-nine percent of the property in the State,
another forty-seven percent was concentrated in only seventy-two
46 Id at 28-29.
47 Id. at 31.
41 Id. at 36.
49 Id. at 32 ("Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spo-
ken, the public interest had been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.").
so Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
5 Id at 33.
52 Id ("If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.").
5 Id. at 235-36 (citing Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893)).
54 Midkiff 467 U.S. at 231-32.
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private landowners." Based on extensive hearings on the matter, the
legislature found that the concentration "was responsible for skewing
the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and in-
juring the public tranquility and welfare." 56
In an attempt to remedy these problems, the Hawaii Legisla-
ture passed the Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed the gov-
ernment to condemn residential properties and then transfer owner-
ship of the tracts to existing lessees in fee simple. 7  Landowners
whose properties had been condemned under the Act brought suit in
United States District Court alleging a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Their main contention was
that the land was not taken for a public purpose; instead the Act was a
mere attempt to transfer private property to lessees solely for their
private use and benefit.59 While the district court found the Act con-
stitutional under the Public Use Clause, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, agreeing with appellees that the
condemnations were nothing more than thinly veiled attempts on the
part of the government to benefit private individuals.60
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to
hear the case. 6 1 The Court began its analysis by reaffirming its hold-
ing in Berman that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is . . . coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."62 However, this
power is not unlimited and when the government takes an individu-
al's property solely for the private benefit of another person without
providing for any public purpose, this exercise of power will be un-
constitutional even if compensation is paid.63 To satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement, the legislature need only state a legitimate pur-
pose and use a rational means for exercising its eminent domain
power.6 It is irrelevant whether the statute actually succeeds or fails




' Midkiff 467 U.S. at 235.
60 id.
61 Id. at 236, prob. juris. noted, 464 U.S. 932 (1983) ("On applications of HHA and cer-
tain private appellants who had intervened below, this Court noted probable jurisdiction.").
62 Id. at 240.
63 Id. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
6 Midkiff' 467 U.S. at 242-43.
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so long as the State truly believes the legislation would promote a
public purpose.65 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Ha-
waii Act passed this test since correcting market deficiencies through
the redistribution of fee simples was a legitimate and rational exercise
of the State's eminent domain power.66
Moreover, just because property, which was taken through the
exercise of eminent domain, was transferred to private individuals
does not necessarily mean that there was only a private use for the
taking.67 Thus, although the Hawaii statute transferred property to
private persons, it still furthered the State's goal of correcting the
market deficiencies.68 In this instance, it was unnecessary for the
State to take actual possession of the land in order to further the
State's goals.69 It is immaterial that the State did not actually use the
property in Midkiff since "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause."70
While a taking that was purely private would not survive scrutiny, in
this case, the Court held that the taking was not purely private since
the correction of the market deficiencies was a legitimate public pur-
pose.7 '
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court examined
whether the City of New London's decision to take private property
for economic development purposes violated the Public Use Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 72 The City of New London, Connecticut
had suffered decades of economic decline, which led a state agency
to characterize the city as a "distressed municipality" in 1990.73 Due
to the deteriorating condition of the city, in 1998 state officials de-
cided to enact a program to revitalize the city and in particular the
Fort Trumbull area.74 In support of this goal, the State authorized a
5.35 million dollar bond to be used by the New London Development
65 Id. at 242.
66 Id. at 243.
67 Id. at 243-44 ("The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned
property be put into use for the general public.").
68 Id. at 244.
69 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
7o Id.
71 Id. at 245.
72 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
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Corporation ("NLDC") in its plans to revitalize the city.75
Petitioners were residents of Fort Trumbull whose properties
had been condemned solely because they were located in the pro-
posed project site.76 There was no evidence that Petitioners' property
itself was blighted.77 Petitioners commenced this action in state court
contending that the taking violated the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.7 8 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the tak-
ing of land for the economic development project did constitute a
"public use."
Following in the footsteps of Berman and Midkiff, the United
States Supreme Court noted that legislatures have broad discretion in
determining what public needs require the taking of private property
through eminent domain.80 Consequently, the Court had little diffi-
culty concluding that the taking of property satisfied the Public Use
Clause since the Connecticut statute specifically sought to improve
the economic development of New London.8 ' Further, the Court re-
jected Petitioners' contention that economic development could not
be considered a public purpose. 82 While the Court concluded that
there was nothing in the Fifth Amendment which prevented the tak-
ing of the property, a State is free to restrict its own exercise of emi-
nent domain power.83
Just as the term "public use" has been construed broadly un-
der federal law, New York courts have long interpreted the term
broadly, finding that there has been a "public use" provided that there
75 id.
7 Id. at 475.
" Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
78 id.
9 Id. at 476.
80 Id. at 483 (For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in de-
termining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.").
8" Id. at 484.
82 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
It would be incongruous to hold that the City's interest in the economic
benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area
has less of a public character than any of those other interests. Clearly
there is no basis for exempting economic development from our tradi-
tionally broad understanding of public purpose.
Id.
8 Id. at 489.
2010] 871
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has been a public benefit.84 In New York City Housing Authority v.
Muller, New York City Housing Authority sought to exercise its
power under the Municipal Housing Authorities Law to condemn
properties in New York City, which were owned by Muller. The
Housing Authority claimed that the land was needed as part of a plan
to reconstruct an area of the city that it determined to be unsanitary
and contain substandard housing.86
The statute at issue in Muller authorized a state authority to
"plan and carry out projects for the clearing, replanning, and recon-
struction of slum areas and the providing of housing accommodations
for persons of low income." 87 Following the approach taken by the
Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals stated that legisla-
tive findings concerning the need for such a statute should be af-
forded considerable deference. 8 This deference stems from the fact
that the statute was enacted specifically to deal with public conditions
which it was the Legislature's duty to know about.89 In defining the
boundaries of the State's eminent domain powers, the Court of Ap-
peals declared:
The fundamental purpose of government is to protect
the health, safety, and general welfare of the pub-
lic. . . . Whenever there arises, in the state, a condition
of affairs holding a substantial menace to the public
health, safety, or general welfare, it becomes the duty
of the government to apply whatever power is neces-
sary and appropriate to check it.90
Thus, the court appears to have adopted a broad view of the State's
power to take private land for the public's benefit. 91
The New York Court of Appeals found that the slums in New
York City were such a menace that the legislature was justified in
84 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 156.
8 Id. at 153.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 154 (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921); People v. Charles Schwein-
ler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 642 (N.Y. 1915)).
89 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
90 Id. at 155.
91 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
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seeking to redevelop the area.92 Moreover, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the use was private and not public since only a limited
number of people would actually receive the benefit of the redeve-
lopment project.93 Citing numerous Supreme Court cases, the New
York Court of Appeals noted that requiring the entire public to bene-
fit has been abandoned as a test for public use. 94 Therefore, the court
found that the redevelopment project served a public use and the tak-
ing of private property for this use was in fact valid.95
In Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris, the
New York Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the
land that was taken by the Yonkers Community Development Agen-
cy was taken for a public use as required by the New York State Con-
stitution and United States Constitution. 96  The plaintiff agency
sought an order for the condemnation of land that it wished to use in
connection with state and federal legislation passed to remove subs-
tandard conditions in the City of Yonkers. 97 In response, the defen-
dants, who were tenants and landowners to be affected by the redeve-
lopment project, claimed that the land was not being taken for a
public use since the agency was planning on using the land to expand
the Otis Elevator Company plant. 98
The court began its discussion by noting that urban renewal
projects are no longer limited to cleaning up slums as had originally
been intended.99 Instead, urban renewal projects are now understood
to include improving "economic underdevelopment and stagnation"
since those conditions constitute a large enough threat to the public to
be characterized as public uses.100 Although Otis had a private inter-
est in the redevelopment project, the New York Court of Appeals
92 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
93 id.
94 Id. (citing Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power
Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531
(1906); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923); Fallbrook Irriga-
tion Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896)).
9 Id. at 156.




10 Id. (citing Cannata v. City of New York, 182 N.E.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. 1962); Kaskel v.
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stated that this did not take away from the public use of the project."o0
Just as was true under federal law, the New York Court of Appeals
has also stated that when land is taken for the purpose of protecting
"the public safety, public health and public welfare" the State's pow-
er to take property through eminent domain is broad. 102
Since the states are given wide latitude in determining what
constitutes a public use, great deference is given to a state agency's
determination that an area is blighted and should be redeveloped as
part of an urban renewal project. 103 Thus, once an area is found to be
blighted, a court may only review this determination on a limited ba-
siS. 104 However, the findings made by a state agency are not by
themselves determinative and the court must make its own indepen-
dent determination that the land was taken for public use.'os In Mor-
ris, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' deci-
sions that the land had been taken for a constitutionally valid purpose
primarily on the basis that the landowners failed to properly raise the
issue of the quality of their land. 106 The court concluded by stating
that since the landowners' buildings had already been demolished by
the time the court heard the case, they were no longer entitled to the
relief sought, which had been the retention of their properties.107
Given the foregoing discussion, it is unsurprising that the ap-
pellate division in Goldstein found that there had been no violation of
the New York State Constitution for lack of "public use, purpose, or
benefit."' First, the narrow reading of section 7 that the Petitioners
advocated for had long been rejected by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Muller.'09 For the Petitioners to cling to the idea that the en-
tire public must benefit in order to constitute a public use is inconsis-
tent with a decision made by the New York Court of Appeals well
before the Supreme Court began to read the Public Use Clause more
"01 Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 331.
102 Id. at 332.
103 Id. (citing Cannata, 182 N.E.2d at 399; Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661; Denihan Enter. v.
O'Dwyer, 99 N.E.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. 1951); Murray, 52 N.E.2d at 888).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 333 (citing Denihan, 99 N.E.2d at 238).
106 Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 334.
107 Id.
10 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
109 Id. at 532.
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expansively in its decisions from Berman through Kelo." 0
The New York Court of Appeals explicitly stated that "[u]se
of a proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody and any-
body is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use.""'
Thus, the fact that Bruce Ratner and Forest City may personally ben-
efit from the Atlantic Yards project is not enough for the Petitioners
to conclude that the land was not taken for a public use since the
project creates new housing, an arena, improvements to public trans-
portation and employment opportunities.112
By abandoning the narrow definition of "public use," the New
York Court of Appeals paved the way for a broader interpretation of
the term." 3 As the court stated in Muller, the power of eminent do-
main can be used whenever a condition poses a "substantial menace
to the public health, safety, or general welfare."" 4 Since the blight
study showed that the Atlantic Yards project site was characterized
by "substandard and unsanitary conditions," the ESDC was clearly
justified in concluding that the public health of the community was
threatened by these conditions. 15 Additionally, the fact that the study
showed that there was a higher than average crime rate supports the
finding that the public safety of the community was in jeopardy by
allowing the area to remain blighted.' 16 Hence, the appellate division
could reasonably conclude that the land was taken for a "public use"
under the broad definition of the term." 7
Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals, by applying
the broad definition of "public use," has held that in an urban renewal
case the term is not limited to the elimination of slums.118 The broad
view thus gives courts a lot of leeway in determining whether or not
the public use requirement has been met. In this case, the creation of
a new arena, new job opportunities, and new housing easily meets the
"public use" requirement under both the United States and New York
110 Id.
. Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
112 Goldstein I, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
"' Id. at 533.
114 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
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Constitutions.1 1 9
Finally, since great deference is given to a finding by an
agency of the New York State Legislature that designated land is
blighted, the Appellate Division Second Department correctly deter-
mined that the land in Goldstein was taken for a public use. 120 In
fact, the burden is on the property owner to prove that no rational re-
lation exists between the proposed taking and a valid public pur-
pose. 12' As the New York Court of Appeals has stated, "If an ade-
quate basis for a determination is shown and the objector cannot
show that the determination was without foundation, the agency's de-
termination should be confirmed."1 22 Since the ESDC was able to
cite numerous public uses, such as creating new job opportunities and
new housing, the court correctly determined that the Petitioners failed
to meet their burden of proving that the taking did not serve a legiti-
mate public use.123
Accordingly, landowners in New York whose property has
been condemned by the State can expect to find difficulty in arguing
that the land was not taken for a "public use." As noted, "public use"
has been interpreted broadly under both the United States and New
York Constitutions. This gives state agencies a considerable amount
of latitude in finding a legitimate public purpose for the taking. Once
the State has determined that the land was taken for a legitimate pub-
lic use, courts are very hesitant to overturn the legislature's finding
and will most often respect this finding unless there is no rational ba-
sis for the taking.
Melissa B. Schlactus
119 Id
120 See Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 332.
121 Goldstein 1, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
122 Id. (quoting Waldo's, Inc. v. Village of Johnson City, 543 N.E.2d 74, 76 (N.Y. 1989)
(internal quotations omitted)).
123 Id. See also Kareem Fahim, After Years of Controversy, Ceremonial Shovels Come
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A18 (stating that after years of litigation, Forest City
Ratner has finally broken ground on the Atlantic Yards Project).
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